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CONFLICT OF LAWS AND NONBARRABLE
INTERESTS IN ADMINISTRATION OF
DECEDENTS' ESTATES*
EUGENE F. SCOLEs**
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

An owner of property usually has power to dispose of it by inter
vivos or testamentary transfer. This power is hedged about by various
limitations. One common type of limitation is concerned with the
formalities to be observed in making the transfer, such as the requirements of a writing, an acknowledgment, or of witnesses. In addition
to these formal requirements, there are substantive limitations upon
inter vivos transfers, such as those resulting from dower or homestead
law. The substantive limitations upon testamentary transfers usually
appear in the form of required provisions for particular members of
the decedent's family. Conflict of laws problems incident to these
nonbarrable interests of the family include dower, curtesy, forced share,
allowances for the surviving spouse ind family, and homestead rights.
There are still other limitations upon testamentary dispositions, such
as restrictions upon charitable gifts, rights given the pretermitted heir
or spouse, and the doctrine of revocation of wills by subsequent marriage or divorce. The limitations of the nature of the last group are
not discussed because they do not give to any specific person an interest
that cannot be subjected to the control of the estate owner.
Description of NonbarrableInterests
In the United States the nonbarrable interests vary widely among
the states in regard to the methods used to give family protection, the
amounts given, and the names employed to designate these interests.
*A related article by the author may be found in 30 IND. L.J. 293 (1955).
"AB. 1943, JD. 1945, University of Iowa; LL.M. 1949, Harvard University;

Professor of Law, University of Florida.-
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Three general classes, however, can be distinguished: (1) dower or statutory forced share, (2) family allowance for support, and (3) homestead.
While in some states common law dower still exists, in most states
it has become a statutory forced share even though the older term
dower may be retained.' The forced share statutes usually give the
widow an absolute interest in one third or one half of the decedent's
assets, both real and personal.2 This interest may, in addition, have
priority over the claims of the decedent's creditor's3 A surviving husband quite generally is given the same right as a widow in the estate
of a deceased spouse even though curtesy, by name, has been abolished
4
in all but a few states.
Nearly all states provide for an interim allowance for support
of the widow and minor children during the time the estate is being
administered.5 Although this is usually expressed as an allowance for
support only, it may include interests that overlap the forced share and
homestead. For example, the amount of the allowance may be fixed
by statute without regard for need, and in some states it may be
claimed by surviving husbands as well as by widows. 6 The amounts
allowable by statute vary from state to state, ranging from $75 upwards. 7 Many statutes provide for a reasonable amount to be determined by the courts.8 Amounts up to $2,500 per month have been
'E.g., IOWA CODE §636.5 (1954); see I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §5.1 (Casner ed.
1952); 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §189 (1935).
2E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 176, §1 (1935); FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1953); IOWA CODE
§636.5 (1954); MINN. STAT. §525.16 (1953); N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW §18; see 3 VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 189 (1935).
5E.g., FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1951); IND. ANN. STAT. §6-202 (Bums 1953); Thompson
v. Union & Mercantile Trust Co., 164 Ark. 411, 262 S.W. 324 (1924); see I AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §5.42; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §190 (1935).
4E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 3, §170 (Smith-Hurd 1951); IOWA CODE §636.6 (1954);
N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW §18.
5
Some states do not give an allowance as such but limit it to homestead exemptions or widows' quarantines. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§18-201, 406 (1951); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §3:37-4 (1939); Wis. STAT. §237.02 (1953).
6ARK. STAT. ANN. §62-2501 (Cum. Supp. 1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. C.3, §330 (SmithHurd Cum. Supp. 1954); MINN. STAT. §525.15 (1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§462.450,
460 (Vernon 1949).
7E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, §665 (1940); COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 176, §211 (Cum. Supp.
1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §59-403 (Corrick 1949); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art.
93, §§332, 3 (1951); N.H. Rzv. LAWS c. 359, §1 (1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. §30-17 (Cum.
Supp. 1953).
8E.g., ARIZ. CODE ANN. §38-903 (1939); CAL. PROB. CODE §680 (Deering 1953);
CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. §7033 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. §15-501 (1948); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2422, 3252 (West 1952); MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 193, §13 (1933); MIcH.
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granted, and $7,000 to $10,000 annual allowances are not uncommon. 9
These allowances usually have priority over the claims of the creditors of the estate.10 While the true family allowance is payable whether
the surviving spouse elects to take under the will or not," some statutes
require an election and some provide that the allowance be deducted
from the distributive share later received.' 2 Exempt personal assets,
such as clothing, household furnishings, and supplies, are often included in the allowance to the surviving spouse.' 3 These are quite
similar to the homestead interests, which give exempt personalty to
14
the surviving spouse and minor children.
In addition to the exempt personalty, the homestead rights usually
include a right to occupy or to receive the residence of the decedent
free from the claims of creditors. 5 Those unfamiliar with it often
§27.3178 (138) (Supp. 1953); MIss. CODE ANN. §561 (1942); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, §320.211 (Purdon 1950); WASH. REv. CODE §11.52.040 (1951); Wyo.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. §6-1501 (1945).
9
1n re Lux's Estate, 114 Cal. 73, 45 Pac. 1023 (1896); In re Foreman's Estate,
16 Cal. App.2d 96, 60 P.2d 310 (1936); Gaskins v. Gaskins, 311 Ky. 59, 223 S.W.2d
374 (1949); Mankowski's Estate, 110 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Surr. Ct. 1952); McComb's Estate,
80 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio Prob. 1948); cf. Dorsey v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co.,
82 Ga. App. 237, 60 S.E.2d 828 (1950).
10ArK. STAT. ANN. §62-2501 (Cum. Supp. 1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 176, §211
(Cum. Supp. 1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §59-403 (Corrick 1949); IDAHO CODE ANN.
STAT. ANN.

§15-504 (1947).
" Wahl's Estate, 256 Mo. App. 345, 158 S.W.2d 743 (1942); Andros v. Flournoy,
22 N.M. 582, 166 Pac. 1173 (1917); Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 68 R.I. 43, 26 A.2d
482 (1942); O'Donnell's Estate, 71 S.D. 339, 24 N.W.2d 326 (1946); DYL. REV. CODE

c. 98, §78 (1935).
12E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §113-1007 (1935); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 3, §334 (Smith-Hurd
1941); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §59-403 (Corrick 1949); Ky. REv. STAT. §391.030 (1953);
ME. REv. STAT. c. 156, §§14, 16 (1954); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 193, §13 (1933); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §27.3178 (138) (1943); N.H. REV. LAws c. 359, §1 (1942); TENN. CODE
ANN. §8231 (Williams 1934). See also In re David's Estate, 227 Ia. 352, 288 N.W.

418 (1939); In re Wenzel's Estate, 161 Kan. 545, 170 P.2d 618 (1946); Porter v. Axline,
154 Kan. 87, 114 P.2d 849 (1941); Sturtevant v. Wentworth, 226 Mass. 459, 115 N.E.
927 (1917).
13E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §664 (1940); IOWA CODE §635.7 (1954); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §59-403 (1949); MINN. STAT. §525.15 (1953); R.I GEN. LAWS c. 577,
§6 (1938); S.D. CODE §35.1302 (1939); W. VA. CODE §3906 (1943).
14E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §62-2 (1947); FLA. CONST. art. X, §1; MIss. CODE ANN. §476

(1942); N.Y.

SUnnoGATE's COURT

Acr §200;

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 58, §311 (Cum.

Supp. 1954); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. §3832 (Vernon 1925); WASH. REv. CODE
§§11.52.010-.016 (1951).
'5E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §661 (Cum. Supp. 1953); CAL. PROB. CODE §660
(1953); FLA. CONST. art. X, §I; MINN. STAT. §525.39 (1953); TEX. STAT. ANN. §3833
(Vernon 1925).
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think of homestead as a minor right secured to a needy people of a
bygone era. Although homestead was born of the needs of pioneers,
it has become an important part of our modern structure of family
property interests and may be the most valuable of the nonbarrable
interests in many estates. It is the primary protective device for minor
children and perhaps is the American counterpart of the civil law
legitime.16 The homestead rights of the surviving spouse are usually
independent of the forced share, though some states require an election
between the two.1 7
The nature of the interests given under the different legal terms
vary from state to state to such a degree that there is considerable overlapping among the statutes in all categories.1s What may be called
a family allowance in one state may be similar to the interest called
homestead, dower, or forced share in others. This variation in terminology suggests that caution must be used in interpreting general discussions in light of the property structure of a particular state.
Statement of the Conflicts Problems
When a decedent leaves assets in several states, important conflict of laws problems arise in determining the existence and scope
of nonbarrable interests. For example, assume that a testator domiciled with his family in state X leaves considerable personal and real
property in state X, considerable realty but little personalty in state Y,
and considerable personalty but no realty in state Z. What law will
determine the amount of the forced share that the widow can claim?
If the law of X, the domicile, gives her a forced share of one half, is
she entitled to one half of the property in the other two states also; or
must she be limited in Y to the one third that Y local law, it will be
assumed, would give her? Should the problem of determining what
16See, I

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§§5.114-.120; Haskins, Homestead Exemp-

tions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1950); cf. BEECHLER, ELECTONS AGAINST WILLS 5, 16
(1940); Laube, Right of a Testator to Pauperize His Helpless Dependents, 13 CoRNELL

L.Q. 559 (1928).

'7Canavan v. McNulty, 328 Ill. 388, 159 N.E. 782 (1927); In re David's Estate,
227 Iowa 352, 288 N.W. 418 (1939); Wilson's Adm'r v. Wilson, 288 Ky. 522, 156
S.W.2d 832 (1941); Stanton v. Leonard, 344 Mo. 998, 130 S.W.2d 487 (1939); see
Wrenne v. American Nat'l Bank, 183 Tenn. 247, 191 S.W.2d 547 (1946); Seaton v.
Seaton, 184 Va. 180, 34 S.E.2d 236 (1945); 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §5.115.
ISE.g., ARIZ. CODE ANN. §38-902 (1939), §38-905 (Cum. Supp. 1951); CAL. PROB.
CODE §645 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. §15-505 (1947); N.D. REv. CODE §30-1701 (1943);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §317.
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constitutes one half the estate arise in the courts of the state of the
domicile, are the assets located in other states to be included in the
computation of her fractional share? If so, what would be the effect
of such a decree elsewhere? To put the question in general terms,
are the rights of the surviving spouse determined by the law of the
domicile or of the situs of property or of the forum?
This hypothetical estate presents problems concerning the family
allowance also. Can an allowance be made in a state other than the
domicile? If an allowance order is made in a state in which the assets
are insufficient to satisfy it, may it be enforced in another state in
which other assets are located? Similar difficulties may arise as to
homestead rights. For example, can homestead rights be claimed in
states other than the domicile; can they be claimed simultaneously
in more than one state?
It is proposed to treat these problems by first discussing the pertinent policies regarding the nonbarrable interests and then considering
the governing law applicable to the various interests.
PURPOSES AND POLICIES INCIDENT TO NONBARRABLE INTERESTS

Conflict of laws decisions, like those in any other field of the law,
are made one way rather than another because of some reason based
on social purpose or policy. The purposes reflected in a particular
rule or decision may be simple or complex. They may be those relating
to purely local matters such as the regularity of title to land or those
incident to interstate situations such as the recognition of foreign
judgments. In any event, it is necessary to consider and to weigh the
relevant policies if a reasoned choice of law is to be made. While
these policies are rather numerous and are found in varying combinations, the number of possible choices of law in most cases is quite
limited. For example, the policies will normally refer only to the
domiciles of the parties, to the place where the property is located,
or to the forum. The recognition and consideration of these forces
that are given effect by courts and legislatures will assist in making a
realistic analysis of what has been done and in suggesting appropriate
choices in future cases. The policies are listed and described at this
point because they may be applicable to any one of the situations or
cases later discussed. In this division of the discussion, no effort is
made to determine the validity or weight of these policies. Their
relative force in particular situations will be considered in the subsequent portions of the article.
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Local Law Policies
a. Supporting Nonbarrable Interests
The local law policies supporting nonbarrable interests center
about the protection of the family as a primary unit of our social,
governmental, and economic system and the fair consideration of the
individuals concerned in a particular estate problem.
Protection of the Family. The protection of the family as a productive and social unit is a general basic policy of the law that favors giving nonbarrable interests to family members. 19 In its broader connotations this policy perhaps overlaps others. In a society in which
the family is still a most important institution, evidences of family
protection are bound to appear in many areas. Several of the nonbarrable interests, such as family allowance and homestead, are designed to implement this basic purpose directly. Economic protection
and social protection of the family are probably inseparable, 20 since
the social standing of families - in modern, as in ancient times - is
often dependent upon property holdings. The force of this policy is
frequently enhanced by its statutory priority over creditors.
The Support Obligation. As a means of furthering the protection
of the family unit, society has imposed upon the husband an obligation
to support his wife and children during his lifetime. The nonbarrable
interests may be deemed essentially a continuation of this obligation
in substituted form after his death. 21 Probably all of the interests involved reflect to some extent this design to extend the support obligation. The obligation continues only during the widowhood of his
spouse and the minority of his children. This limitation is recognized
in dower and its statutory substitutes giving the widow a life estate
in certain property. Homestead rights, widow's quarantine, and family
'9 1n re Blair's Estate, 269 P.2d 612 (Cal. 1954); In re Beauchamp's Estate, 23
Del. Ch. 377, 2 A.2d 900 (Orphan's Ct. 1938); In re Macneal's Estate, 174 Misc.
947, 22 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Surr. Ct. 1940); In re Caroleo's Estate, 174 Misc. 288, 20
N.Y.S.2d 581 (Surr. Ct. 1940); In re Welch's Estate, 200 Wash. 686, 94 P.2d 758 (1939).
20Dutton v. Swann, 219 Ala. 425, 122 So. 636 (1929); In re Jermyn's Will, 72
N.Y.S.2d 244 (Surr. Ct. 1947); see I AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§5.2,3.
21In re Cooper's Estate, 97 Cal. App.2d 186, 217 P.2d 499 (1950); Williams v.
Pollard, 101 Colo. 262, 72 P.2d 476 (1937); Hobbs v. Hobbs, 179 Tenn. 1, 162 S.W.2d
394 (1942); In re Bundy's Estate, 241 P.2d 462 (Utah 1952).
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allowances further illustrate the continued effect given the support
obligation in our law.
Protection of the State. The policy to protect the state from the
burden of support of indigent persons and from the threat of social
instability is a part of the broad family protection policy. This third
aspect, however, becomes distinguishable from the first two when the
general policy of society is limited by a particular jurisdiction so as
to apply only to families within its borders.2 2 The individual state's
self-interest gives support to nonbarrable interests by promoting the
maintenance of the family as a unit in order to give stability to the
state's social and economic structure.2 3 But this same self-interest becomes a limiting factor in some multi-state cases when the state refuses
an allowance to nonresident families. For this reason it is stated as
being separable from the broader societal policy of protecting families
generally.
Presumed Contribution. Another subdivision of the general family
protection policy is the recognition of presumed contribution to an
estate by members of the decedent's family. This subpolicy finds effect
in dower, forced share, and community property. 24 The support in
fact for this policy is probably limited to the widow's interests, except
perhaps for rural homestead rights for adult children. 25
Economy in Transmission of Property. This policy is present in
most estate problems. While economy will aid the family by leaving
more for their use, this particular motive probably exists in nonfamily
cases as often as not. For that reason it seems separate from the family
protection policies. Formerly, a deduction equal to amounts paid
22Deeble v. Alerton, 58 Colo. 166, 143 Pac. 1096 (1914); Cf. MARSH, MARITAL
136 (1951).
23Robson v. Meder, 66 Cal. App.2d 47, 151 P.2d 662 (1944); In re Schoenfelder's
Estate, 161 Misc. 654, 292 N.Y. Supp. 647 (Surr. Ct. 1937). This self-interest policy
is similar to that of protecting the wife's relatives from the duty to support her at
her husband's death. The self-interest of relatives, which incidentally protects the
state, was given effect in earlier times in church-door dower, bride barter, and
jointure provisions incident to marriage, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§5.2-A.
24Cohen v. Cohen, 82 Ohio App. 260, 80 N.E.2d 813 (1947); BEECHLER, ELECtIONS
AGAINST WILLS 9 (1940); MARSH, op. cit. supra note 22, at 11.
25
See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, §1; Wis. STAT. §237.025 (1953); see also 1 AMEmICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §5.117.
PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol8/iss2/1

8

Scoles:
Conflict of Laws
and
Nonbarrable
Interests
in Administration of D
LAW
REVIEW
UNIVERSITY
OF
FLORIDA
for support of dependents was available for federal tax purposes, 2
which gave considerable stimulus for the granting of allowances in
excess of actual need. In some states the assets constituting the allowance, or exempt or homestead property, are not subject to administration, which results in savings in the expenses of administration.27 This policy of economy finds its strongest effect in the statutes
providing for settlement of small estates without administration.
These statutes are often an extension of the exempt property exclusion.2s The potential drain upon an estate by reason of expenses
of administration is increased by the presence of assets in several
29

states.

Equality of the Sexes. The past century has seen an increased
trend toward recognition of the individual. As those social forces
emphasizing the individual increase in strength, some inroads upon the
position of the family as a basic unit of society are bound to occur.
Some of this emphasis is reflected in the policy of providing equal
rights for men and women. In the area of nonbarrable interests this
has had the somewhat anomalous effect of increasing the rights of
men. For example, in some states equality of property rights for
men and women has given the surviving husband a forced share similar to dower 30 and the right to a family allowance. 31 It is a policy
that may become effective when the support theories are factually
weakened.
Justice and Fairness Among Beneficiaries. While the policy of
promoting justice and fairness among the beneficiaries of an estate
is perhaps another aspect of the growing importance of the individual,
26This deduction was formerly allowed by 28 U.S.C. §812 (b) (5), but this provision was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1950.
27See notes 13, 14 supra; Bishop v. Johnson, 242 Ala. 551, 7 So.2d 281 (1942);
Spencer v. Stewart, 202 Cal. 695, 262 Pac. 331 (1927); Dinquel v. Dacco, 273 111.
117, 112 N.E. 337 (1916); Moore v. Rick, 186 Okla. 351, 97 P.2d 884 (1939).
28sSee note 16 supra.
29The policy favoring economy of transmission of property may be opposed in
some cases to the forced share of the surviving spouse. In some situations the
transfer from the deceased to the surviving spouse may be taxed, and at the death
of the spouse the transfer to the children may again be taxed. Thus two taxes
are collected per generation of transmission. This potential tax burden is reduced
by the marital deduction and previously taxed property exemption of the federal
tax statute, INT. REv. CODE §2056.
SOSee note 4 supra.

31See note 6 supra.
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it seems more a development of the abstract concepts of fair play.
This policy of fairness is of particular force in matters concerning
election between inconsistent interests in an estate when the actual
intention of the testator is not fully consistent with social policy.
b. Opposed to NonbarrableInterests
There are strong policies at the local law level that often appear
to oppose the recognition of nonbarrable interests. These rest largely
upon the concepts that an individual should be able to dispose of his
property as he desires and that he should pay his debts before he
displays generosity.
Freedom of Testamentary Disposition. This is a local law policy
opposed to all nonbarrable interests. One of the strongest policies
underlying the law concerning the disposition of property at death
is that of giving effect to the intention of the testator. This policy,
in certain situations, must give way to some extent to those policies
favoring protection of the family. No general scheme of distribution
of property can fit the needs of all the individuals of which society
is composed. The policy favoring freedom of testamentary disposition
meets the need for limitless variation in disposition that is necessary
in a society that values individuality. Accordingly, there probably is
a democratic value recognizing that individual action in property disposition at death should be free from interference unless good cause
is shown.
General economic reasons for freedom of testamentary disposition
are perhaps more difficult to spell out. Economic benefit resulting
from regularity of titles to property is probably promoted, because a
will is better and easier to prove as a muniment of title than is heirship. In addition, it may be urged that greater production of goods
and services is encouraged by permitting the individual to anticipate
free disposition of the returns of his efforts. Incident to this anticipation is the fact that the savings accumulated result in making more
capital available for investment in production facilities. Thus a greater
production capacity may exist in a large estate undivided into smaller
shares by the statutes. Most people, however, are driven to produce
goods by the desire to provide for their families. These drives normally
coincide with policies favoring the nonbarrable interests. Because of
this motivation it seems doubtful that unlimited testamentary freedom

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol8/iss2/1
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is necessary to accomplish the economic results important to the satis32
faction of this policy.

Protection of Creditors. The protection of creditors is a general
policy of the law often opposed to the nonbarrable interests. Many
of the nonbarrable interests have a priority in payment over the claims
of the decedent's creditors. 33 Protection of creditors is one of the
strongest and most consistently effective policies in our legal system.
That it is subverted in this area indicates the strength of the family
protection policies. The normal order of priority of payment under
the local law statutes of the various states is: (1) homestead, which is
often entirely excluded from administration, (2) dower, (3) costs of
administration and expenses of the last illness and funeral, (4) widow's
and family allowance, (5) taxes, (6) creditors' claims, (7) statutory
forced share, and (8) distribution.3 4 The priority of dower and forced
share interests differs from state to state. In some states these two
interests may be free of creditors' claims, as common law dower usually
is, or may be subject to such claims, as the statutory share often is. In
states having both interests, the priority is generally as stated above.
From the order of priority it is apparent that the interests of creditors
are often opposed to those of the preferred family members. This
means that when the policies favoring the family are weakened by
unusual facts the courts will often limit the nonbarrable interests in
favor of creditors. Thus in conflict cases the local creditor may prevail
over the nonresident family member.
Alienability of Land. The free alienability of land is a policy
opposed to those interests, such as inchoate dower and homestead,
S2The sometimes asserted policy favoring wider distribution of wealth has no
real application here because of the limited nature of the nonbarrable interests.
With the possible exception of the spouse's forced share, little opportunity exists
for undue accumulation of wealth. In fact, nonbarrable interests tend to prevent
accumulation in many instances.
53 See note 10 supra.
34
CAL. PROB. CODE §950 (1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 176, §195 (1935); FLA. STAT.
§733.20 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. §113-1508 (1935); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 3, §354 (SmithHurd Cum. Supp. 1954); IOWA CODE §§635.65-.66 (1954); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts.
1189, 3191, 3276 (1945); ME. REv. STAT. c. 114, §1 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN.
LAWS art. 93, §5 (1951); MICH. STAT. ANN. §27.3178 (165) (Cum. Supp. 1953); N.H.
REv. LAWS c. 353, §19

(1942); N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-8-10,11 (1953); OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. §2117.25 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §591 (Cum. Supp. 1954); R.I.
GEN. LAws c. 578, §33 (1938); UTAH CODE ANN. §75-9-21,22 (1953); Wis. STAT. §313.16

(1953).
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that place limitations upon inter vivos conveyances by making it
necessary for the spouse to join in the conveyance. 35 This policy, however, does not seem opposed to those interests that are measured solely
by the property held by the deceased at the time of his death. The reasons for this policy are found in the commercial values incident to
sales and credit transactions derived from free transferability of land
and those reasons favoring freedom of testamentary disposition, this
policy's post-mortem counterpart. In addition to the limitations upon
transfers by the decedent during his lifetime, the cotenancies resulting
from the operation of the forced share statutes make subsequent inter
vivos transfers by the next takers more difficult. Thus the policy of
free alienability may be restricted by nonbarrable interests for successive generations of property owners.
Conflict of Laws Policies
The local law policies discussed above arise in nearly any case.
The multi-state cases, however, make it necessary to consider social
values and policies that extend beyond the interests of any one state.3 6
These conflict of laws policies become important when a state is forced
by the interstate or international character of the factual situation to
recognize that the interests of other political units are involved. Since
it is a function of conflict of laws to provide reasonable solutions to
multi-state problems, these policies are of particular force in these
areas and may be sufficient to cause a result different from that reached
in a purely local matter. The conflict of laws policies represent the
reasons behind particular conflict of laws conclusions. The forces of
the several conflict of laws policies vary in given cases and in some factual situations are so coextensive in their application that it is difficult
to distinguish related values. A recognition of their presence, however,
should aid in the determination of results that will reasonably satisfy
the primary interests of all states and parties involved. Those conflict
of laws policies that seem most pertinent in the cases involving nonbarrable interests are listed and described briefly so that subsequent
reference to them may be made when the occasion arises.
ViSee 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 624; BEECHLER, ELECTIONS AGAINST WILLS 8

(1940).
3GSee Cheatham and Reese, Choice of Applicable Law, 52 COL. L. REv. 959 (1952),
for a more extensive collection of the major policies having effect generally in
conflict of laws cases.
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The State of Dominant Interest. An extremely important conflict
of laws policy is the recognition and application of the law of the state
having the dominant interest. It is sometimes suggested that uniformity is the primary purpose of conflict of laws. Any concept of
uniformity assumes a focal reference - some state must furnish the
applicable rules. The determination of this focal state is perhaps
what is done in every conflicts case. If other states are to adopt a
uniform disposition, the focal state must be one that other states may
reasonably recognize. Consequently, it should be the state that most
courts would consider as having the dominant interest in a multistate controversy. The state of dominant interest may be determined
by reason of the number and weight of its significant contacts or connections. The underlying local law purpose of the possibly applicable
rules will normally determine whether some contacts outweigh
others. For example, the purposes of homestead provisions in affording
a family home and sustenance seem to make the state of the domicile
of the deceased, which is usually the home of his family, the clear focal
point in controversies concerning homestead. Thus, another state
that is a fortuitous forum could reasonably be expected to recognize
the dominant interest of the domicile and decide a particular homestead controversy in accord with the laws of the domicile.
Application of Local Laws. The policy of giving effect to local law
is likewise an important consideration in most cases. Clearly, if the
legislature has enacted a statute applicable to conflict situations it
must be applied. Even when no statute applies directly, there is a
strong tendency to apply local law. This is particularly true when
the effect of the applicable law is to ensure the protection of domiciliaries of the forum. This policy of applying local law stems from confidence in, and familiarity with, the results and purposes of the local
rules. The court that uses its own law can be expected to do so with
less chance of error than if foreign law is used. Often the local law
application will correspond with local policies favoring protection of
the family. The family protection policies conflict, however, with
the fundamental policy behind succession at death, namely, the intent
of the testator. These two very strong local law policies are constantly
present. Family protection policies will probably prevail if the beneficiaries are residents of the forum, whereas if they are nonresidents
the fundamental policy of observing the intention of the testator,
expressed or presumed, becomes relatively stronger in deciding conflicts cases.
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Ease of Determination of Applicable Law. A part of the conflict
of laws policy favoring ease in the determination of the applicable
law is the theory that a choice of law reference should be one that
other states might reasonably be expected to recognize. This policy
is probably of greater significance in the administration of decedents'
estates than in many other fields, because most issues are tried in the
probate courts, which are notoriously local law minded. If a court
is to be convinced that some law other than its own is to be applied,
it must be convenient for the court to determine this law. Although
other policies are of greater theoretical significance, the practical consequences are likely to be such that the convenience of the court may
well decide many close cases.
Predictability and Protection of Justified Expectations. These
policies, which lead to uniformity in matters regarding decedents'
estates, are very important in cases involving assets in different states.
While in particular cases it is usually possible to separate the two,
they overlap so often that they are here considered together. In this
regard, it is necessary to have uniformity in two respects: first, in the
treatment of parts of the same estate however the issue is raised (internal uniformity); and, second, in the treatment of different estates
in the same state (predictability) so that effective future planning is
possible. This dual uniformity is not only important to the participants in an estate but also to those third parties who may deal with an
estate owner or a beneficiary upon the belief that certain assets will
be available for the satisfaction of their claims. These policies are
present in local law questions, but their force is more significant in
conflict of laws cases, inasmuch as there is a greater possibility of
nonuniform results because different states have more or less independent opportunities to weigh the policies that may lead to varied
results. Because of this, the policies favoring certainty, uniformity, and
predictability are frequently thought of as the most important policies
in conflicts cases. They are particularly strong in the estates area.
Uniformity of treatment of the various parts of an estate assumes
that all courts concerned with a particular estate should use the same
standard to measure the interests of persons claiming adversely. In
most instances the use of some single standard would prevent injustice
as a result of the fortuitous location of assets. Consequently, included
in the uniformity policies or at least related thereto is the policy
favoring justice in the individual case. Since application of justice in
the abstract would many times turn on the personal predilections of
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the tribunal, it is necessary to determine it in relation to some standard.
In estate matters, this standard is the law of the state having the
dominant interest in the estate, and it is indicated by the policies
favoring uniformity.
Needs of Interstate and InternationalSystems. The field of conflict
of laws assumes a federal or international system of geographically
separated jurisdictions, each having some independent power to make
effective determinations of litigated issues. The assumption of such a
system contemplates its continued existence. Accordingly, another important policy of conflict of laws, in this area of estates as well as
others, concerns the needs of interstate and international systems. The
interests of international or interstate society must be expected at
times to conflict with those of its individual members. A court deciding
a conflict of laws question should bear in mind the consequences of
its decision upon the interstate system and expect to exercise considerable self-restraint in the application of purely local policy. There
is perhaps an obligation upon the courts when deciding conflicts cases
to reach conclusions that other states may reasonably be expected to
recognize as appropriate. This can probably be furthered by considering, together with other factors, the law of the state that would
normally be the most probable forum in similar factual situations. As
a matter of general administration of justice, this should tend to produce uniform results in different cases.
In short, any court deciding a multi-state controversy is not solely a
local court but, on the conflicts issue, sits as a court of the international
or interstate system. While no suggestion is intended that all conflicts
questions should become federal constitutional issues, it should be
apparent that, as individuals are citizens of both state and nation, so
too are courts both state and "federal" when deciding a conflicts point.
Accordingly, every court is expected to act without discrimination
against foreigners or foreign facts and to give effect to the needs of
the existing interstate and international systems.
The policies discussed are not the only ones that may be taken
into consideration. They do appear, however, to be those that are likely
to be most significant in deciding cases involving nonbarrable interests
and conflict of laws.
LAW GOVERNING NONBARRABLE INTERESTS

The law that courts have held to govern the problems incident
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to nonbarrable interests is often in accord with traditional views in
analogous matters. Because of the different weight the various policies
have been given by different states, however, some peculiar results
have occurred. In discussing the cases the subjects of forced share
and dower, family allowance, and homestead will be treated in turn;
and immovables and movables will be considered under each.
Dower or Statutory Forced Share
a. Immovables
The view generally taken as to the law governing dower or statutory forced share in immovables is consistent with the usual conflict
of laws position. The interest that a surviving spouse takes in an
immovable owned by the deceased spouse is determined by the law
of the state of the situs of the immovable. This is simply an example
of the well-settled rule that distribution of immovables is governed
by the law of the situs. 37 The suggestion has been made that the
domicile of the married couple or of the husband at death should
control. This argument was made to the Iowa court in Ehler v.
Ehler38 on the ground that the law of the marital domicile is part of
the marital contract, which is binding on the husband's assets wherever located.30 The argument was rejected and the local law of the
situs applied.
The continuing strength of the rule of reference to the situs of immovables is illustrated in the cases involving priority of dower over
creditors. In Griggs Estate,40 a Pennsylvania lower court decision,
the decedent died domiciled in Pennsylvania, leaving a badly insolvent
estate. Included in the assets was some New Jersey land that was sold
and the proceeds transmitted to Pennsylvania. The widow was given
her dower share of the proceeds of the New Jersey land free of the
37
1n re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658 (1949); In re Randolph's
Estate, 175 Kan. 685, 266 P.2d 315 (1954); Meyer v. Rogers, 173 Kan. 124, 244 P.2d
1169 (1952); In re Vincent's Estate, 189 Misc. 489, 71 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Surr. Ct. 1947);
2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §248.1 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§164, 166
(3d ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §248 (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 312 (2d ed. 1951).
3SEhler v. Ehler, 214 Iowa 789, 243 N.W. 591 (1932).
39A somewhat similar argument was made in Spence v. Spence, 239 Ala. 480, 195
So. 717, 723 (1940), but without avail, the court concluding that local Alabama law
should be applied; cf. Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940).
4054 Pa. D. & C. (1945).
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claims of creditors as provided under New Jersey law.
While the law of the situs admittedly controls the surviving spouse's
share in a decedent's estate, the law applied is not always local in every
respect. Some references may be made to foreign law for different
incidental matters. For example, in Estate of Bir"1 the California
court permitted two women to claim the widow's share in the decedent's
estate. The decedent, a citizen of India, had there validly married the
two ladies many years before. These marriages were unimpaired until
the death of the deceased, who was domiciled in California. Relying
on the rule that marriages valid where celebrated are valid elsewhere,
the court concluded that no public policy of California was violated
by permitting the two Indian wives to divide the "widow's" share.
This case and others like it 4 z are probably not evidence of a weakening

of the situs rule in succession to land but rather an indication of a
more understanding construction of the law of the situs itself. From
the cases involving land it is clear that courts will consider the situs
to be the state having the dominant interest in land. This has appeared to bring about a predictable result. The Bir case, however,
illustrates the fact that a situs forum may recognize that foreign law
has a greater significance than its own local law on a particular point,
even though land is primarily involved. The situs in this way discharges its obligation as a member of an international system.
b. Movables
The forced distributive share that the surviving spouse may elect to
take in the movable assets of a deceased spouse is governed, almost
without exception, by the law of the decedent's domicile. 43 In this
regard no real distinction is drawn between tangible and intangible
movables. Although there are many problems as to where intangibles
may be administered, there is little doubt as to which law the forum
4183 Cal. App.2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948).
42

Royal v. Cudahy Packing Co., 195 Iowa 759, 190 N.W. 427 (1922); Rogers v.
Cordingley, 212 Minn. 546, 4 N.W.2d 627 (1942); Yew v. Attorney Gen., 1 D.L.R.
1166 (1923); see 2 BEALE, CONFLICT or LAWS §121.1 (1935); Beckett, Recognition of
Polygamous Marriages, 48 L.Q. REv. 341 (1932); Comment, Polygamy and the
Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE L.J. 471 (1923).
4
3E.g., Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916); In re Estate of Randolph, 175
Kan. 685, 266 P.2d 315 (1954); see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§165, 168 (3d ed.
1949);

oF

RSTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

LAWS

§§300, 303, 306 (1935);

STUMBERG,

CONFLICT

411-427 (2d ed. 1951).
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will apply.44 Likewise, the size of the share is governed by the domicile
of the decedent at death. 45 For example, if a person dies leaving

movable property in state Y,which provides that a widow may elect
to take a statutory share of one third of the decedent's personalty, and
the domicile, X, provides that her elective share is to be one half,
state Y may be expected to apply the law of the domicile, X. If Y

distributes the movables there administered in ancillary administration,
it will give the widow one half.46 The usual alternative is to send the
surplus property to the domicile for distribution, where the X court
47
will apply its own law to give the widow one half.
This reference to the domicile by the situs of movables perhaps
need not be made, but the practice is so well established that it is the
near uniform rule in the common law states of this country.4" If a
state should refuse to refer to the domicile, however, and distribute
according to its own law in ancillary administration, the result would
probably not be unconstitutional. For example, a unique statute of
Mississippi provides: 49
"All personal property situated in this state shall descend
and be distributed according to the laws of this state regulating
the descent and distribution of such property, regardless of
all marital rights which may have accrued in other states, and
notwithstanding the domicile of the deceased may have been
in another state, and whether the heirs or persons entitled to
distribution be in this state or not; and the widow of such
deceased person shall take her share in the personal estate according to the laws of this state."
The Mississippi court, in construing the statute, has dearly supported the policy of giving effect to local law and has applied this
44Ibid.; see Hopkins, Conflict of Laws in Administration of Decedents' Intangibles,
28 IowA L. REv. 422, 613 (1943).
452 BEALE, CONFLICT or LAws §301.1 (1935); see also note 43 supra.
46Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577, 56 Am. Dec. 385 (1852); GOODRiCH, CONFLIT OF LAWS §194 (3d ed. 1949).
4
"REsTATEMENT, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS §522 (1935).
4sSee 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAwS §300.1 (1935); GOODmCH, CONFLICT OF LAws
§165 (3d ed. 1949); cf. Glassford's Estate, 249 P.2d 908 (Cal. App. 1952); In re
Menschefrend's Estate, 283 App. Div. 463, 128 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1st Dep't 1954).
49AMss. CODE ANN. §467 (1942). Illinois formerly had a somewhat similar provision, since amended to accord with the usual reference to domicile, ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 3, §162 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1954).
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law to the case of the widow electing against the will as well as to
intestate succession. 50 The statute has not been involved in any case
before the United States Supreme Court, but in other situations that
Court has taken the attitude that the actual situs of personal property
controls distribution on death and that the laws of other states have
no bearing except as the situs state adopts them.51
In the discussion of the share a surviving spouse might claim as
her nonbarrable interest in the estate of a deceased spouse it has
been assumed that the spouse would be permitted to elect in ancillary
administration to take against the will. Whether a surviving spouse
may elect at any given time in a particular state will not be discus6ed
in detail; it is sufficient at this point to note that, if the spouse may
take a statutory share of movables, the extent of that share is governed
by the law of the domicile of the decedent.52 The domicile reference
is so well established that the courts give little indication of the policies
that have led them to this position. The difficulty of determining
domicile has led to some question as to its desirability as a reference. 53
Nevertheless, in a society in which substantial accumulations of wealth
are most often in the form of movables and in an area involving the
family, the domicile clearly seems to be the state having the dominant
interest and the state to which others should refer in order to obtain
the internal uniformity so desirable in the administration of a multistate estate.
c. Measurement by Assets Located in Another State
The courts of the domicile generally have not taken into consideration the value of real property located elsewhere when determining the amount of the local forced share. The leading case is Bankers'
Trust Co. v. Greims, 54 in which the Connecticut court refused to
5OBolton v. Barnett, 131 Miss. 802, 95 So. 721 (1923); Slaughter v. Garland, 40
Miss. 172 (1866); cf. Neblett v. Neblett, 112 Miss. 550, 73 So. 575 (1916).
51Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S.
556 (1942); Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307 (1866), 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139
(1868).
2
5 See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §306.5 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§170 (3d ed. 1949); Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Elections in Administration of Decedents' Estates, 30 IND. L.J. 293 (1955).
53
See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935);
In re Estate of Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 AtI. 601 (Prerog. Ct. 1934); Dorrance's
Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 At. 303 (1932).
54110 Conn. 36, 147 AtI. 290 (1929); accord, In re Bassford's Will, 127 N.Y.S.2d
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measure the forced share of the surviving husband by land in New
York and New Jersey. The reasons given were based primarily on the
construction of a Connecticut statute. The court recognized, however,
that the rights of the surviving spouse in realty are governed by the
law of the situs, where distribution normally occurs. Since distribution could not be controlled by the domicile, the foreign land was
excluded.55
The matter of movables is different; movable assets are distributable according to the law of the domicile wherever located, and they
56
are usually transmitted to the domicile for distribution. Accordingly,
there is sufficient reason for the domicile to measure the legal forced
share by all movable assets in the estate wherever located. The domicile can enforce this by adjusting its distribution to compensate for
any inconsistent distribution in ancillary administration.5 7 Henderson
v. Usher s is one of the few cases treating this problem directly. The
Florida domiciliary left tangible movables in New York as well as in
Florida. The Florida Supreme Court directed that the widow's statutory forced share be measured by such assets even though they were
subject to debts of the deceased in ancillary administration in New
York. The amount of the dower was specifically not to be reduced by
the amount of the debts due in New York.5 9 In applying domicile
law and including foreign assets in the measurement of the forced
share of movables, the case seems clearly sustained by analogous authority.60
653 (Surr. Ct. 1953); cf. In re Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242 (1911);
Decker v. Vreeland, 220 N.Y. 326, 115 N.E. 989 (1917); Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 174

(1863).
S5Cf. Briggs, Utility of the JurisdictionalPrinciple in a Policy Centered Conflict
of Laws, 6 VAi . L. REv. 667 (1953). This case illustrates the different types of
uniformity needed in estates. The reference to the situs by the Connecticut nonsitus forum is the usual recognition that the situs, because of control, is, to the
nonsitus forum, the state of dominant interest. New Jersey, however, could well
refer to Connecticut in order to achieve internal uniformity within the particular
estate. Cf. Estate of Bir, 83 Cal. App.2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948).

S6Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577 (1852);

REsTATEMENT, CONFLIar oF LAws

§522 (1934).
57For a more extensive discussion of this residual control by the domicile see
cases cited infra note 60.
5125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
59Because of the effect of local policies protecting creditors, it is doubtful that
New York would give such a priority over creditors if an estate were in fact insolvent,
even though Florida did so.
6aGriley v. Griley, 43 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949); Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170
So. 856 (1936); Caruso v. Caruso, 106 N.J. Eq. 130, 148 Ad. 882 (Ct. Err. 8- App.
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Another problem arises in ancillary administration under the modern statutes providing for special treatment of small estates. In response to the family protection policies, these statutes are aimed at
preserving for the family a minimum inheritance free of the difficulties
incident to splitting small estates into still smaller shares. To accomplish this, in estates not exceeding stated amounts the surviving
spouse may be given the entire estate prior to, or after, certain creditors. 61 These statutes are framed in general terms, and the question

arises whether the statutory amount includes only assets within the
forum or whether the estate is to be measured by the assets located
in other states as well.
The small estate statutes are by no means uniform, and the
effective provisions may be found in the dower, forced share, allowance,
homestead, or intestate succession statutes, depending upon the state.
So far as they involve intestate succession of real property, the courts
in two important cases have indicated that, although the law of the
situs of the land determines its succession, testate or intestate, still
the situs can and will consider out-of-state contacts when making
the internal choice between the situs' regular succession statutes and
62
the situs' small estates statute. In the first of these cases, Hite v. Hite,
the Massachusetts court took the position that, while the law of the
state in which realty is located governs its devolution, the courts of
the situs can consider the fact of nonresidence of the decedent and
widow. Because of this nonresidence, the court applied the ancillary
administration statute, which incorporated the general succession statute giving the spouse one half. The court reasoned that the purpose of
the small estates statute was to aid widows of resident owners of small
estates and that the small estate statute should not apply when part
of the assets are governed by a different law. In addition, this widow
had previously received a $2,400 allowance in Ohio, the domicile of
the decedent, and would take three fourths of the personalty on distribution. The court refused to rely upon the fact that, even though
local assets were less than the statutory limit, the total value of the
estate did not meet the requirements of the Massachusetts small
estate statute.
1930); Cumming's Estate, 153 Pa. 397, 25 At.

1125 (1893); Van Dyke's Appeal, 60

Pa. 481 (1869); In re Lawrence's Will, 93 Vt. 424, 108 At. 387 (1919).
61IOWA CODE §636.32 (1954); MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 190, §1 (1955); N.H. REv.
LAWS c. 359, §§10-13 (1942); N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §83; statutes cited supra note 18.
62301 Mass. 294, 17 N.E.2d 176 (1938); cf. Cheney v. Cheney, 214 Mass. 580, 101
N.E. 1091 (1913).
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An Iowa court in Estate of Clemmons63 held that the small estate
statute governed the devolution of Iowa land owned by a Wisconsin
decedent. To determine whether the statutory amount had been exceeded, the court looked to assets in both states and, finding the combined estate to be within the legislative limit, allowed the widow of
the foreign domiciliary to receive all the Iowa land under the Iowa
statute.
An analogous New York statute64 giving the first $10,000 worth of
assets to the surviving spouse was construed in Ineson's Estate65 in
such a manner as to afford a potential windfall to the surviving spouse
by reason of the location of assets in different states. The widow of a
Connecticut decedent was given all the New York real estate on the
theory that realty devolves by the law of the situs and that therefore
only the value of local land can be considered in determining distribution.
The cases construing small estate statutes illustrate the variant
results possible within the well-established situs rule. Even though
the situs controls, it is not necessary for that state to limit its vision to
its own territory in determining to give effect to the policies that it
considers significant. The Hite case concluded that the statute was in
support of local widows even while recognizing that the particular
claimant had already been provided a support allowance elsewhere.
On the other hand, the Iowa court chose to apply its statute to all
widows before its courts, provided the total assets everywhere fell below
the statutory limit. In both cases the court gave effect to its own policy
while recognizing that the entire estate was, in proper perspective,
one unit which could easily be treated as a whole. There seems no
real reason why either the domicile or the state of ancillary administration should dose its eyes to the fact that assets are located elsewhere.
Should the policy of the domicile conflict with that of ancillary jurisdiction, the policies of the state of dominant interests should be given
effect.
Under the cases dealing with the various types of forced share for
the surviving spouse, different law will be applied to the same estate,
depending upon whether the assets involved are immovables or
movables. Most states will treat immovables according to the law of
63242 Iowa 1248, 49 N.W.2d 883 (1951).
64N.Y. DEC. EsT. LAw §83.
65198 M.isc. 999, 104 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Surr. Ct. 1951); cf. In re Harris' Estate, 150 Misc.
758, 271 N.Y. Supp. 464 (1934).
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the situs and movables according to the law of the domicile of the
decedent at death. There are indications, however, that the force of
the policies favoring uniform treatment of the entire estate will lead
the situs of immovables to consider nonsitus policies that may have
greater significance than purely local law policies.
Widows' and Family Allowances
a. Effect of Residence or Nonresidence
In the cases involving allowances it makes very little difference,
for conflict of laws purposes, whether the allowance is to be made out
of immovable or movable assets. In either case it is necessary to petition
the court having the property within its jurisdiction for the allowance.
Because of this, the problems concerning both classifications of assets
will be discussed together. This singular treatment of the allowance
problem stems from the fact that family allowances are generally
characterized for nonconflicts purposes as expenses for debts of administration, payable prior to creditors' claims, and also from the
fact that allowances are often viewed as provisions for the protection
of local families. 66 For example, in determining the priority of claims,
support allowances are traditionally preferred claims, even prior to
tax claims in some instances;67 and the federal tax statute treated them
as deductible expenses until recently.6s The combined effect has been
that the courts usually look to their own local statutes for the solution
even while referring to a so-called general rule that only the domiciliary administration can determine or make an allowance for the
family in absence of specific statutory provision.69 Most of the statutes
make no reference to governing law;0 a few provide for the families
66 Wigington v. Wigington, 112 Colo. 78, 145 P.2d 980 (1944); In re Estate of
Wernet, 61 Ohio App. 304, 22 N.E.2d 490 (1938); Atwood v. Miller, 10 Ohio Supp.
131 (1942).
67Postmaster v. Robbins, 19 Fed. Cas. 1126, No. 11,314 (D. Me. 1829); In re
Carl's Estate, 94 N.E.2d 239 (Ohio Prob. 1950); Fackler's Estate, 27 Ohio Op. 232
(1942); see note 34 supra.
68See note 26 supra.
6
91n re Estate of Beauchamp, 23 Del. Ch. 377, 2 A.2d 900 (Orphan's Ct. 1938);
Mitchell v. Word, 64 Ga. 208 (1879); Smith v. Howard, 86 Me. 203, 29 At. 1008
(1894); Richardson v. Lewis, 21 Mo. App. 531 (1886); In re Estate of Bleicher, 142
Misc. 549, 255 N.Y. Supp. 368 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Jones v. Layne, 144 N.C. 600, 57
S.E. 372 (1907); In re Babcock's Estate, 64 S.D. 283, 266 N.W. 420 (1936); cf. In re

Metcalf's Estate, 93 Mont. 542, 19 P.2d 905 (1933).
70See generally statutes cited supra notes 6, 7, 8, except as noted infra notes

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1955

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1955], Art. 1
DECEDENTS' ESTATES
of nonresident decedents; 71 and some expressly prohibit such al72
lowances.
In considering the effect of residence or nonresidence of the parties
in family allowances, three practical questions should be borne in
mind: (1) will the forum entertain the petition; (2) if so, will the
forum use its local law or foreign law to measure the allowance; and
(3) will the forum consider the value of assets everywhere or only those
in the forum? The results that have been reached in the cases cast
some doubt on the existence of any generally accepted single rule for
determining the solution of these questions. There are four basic
situations in which the problems arise: (1) resident decedent and
resident claimant, (2) resident decedent and nonresident claimant,
(3) nonresident decedent and resident claimant, and (4) nonresident
decedent and nonresident claimant. It will be seen that the first two
situations arise in domiciliary administration, while the latter two are
ancilliary administration problems.
Resident Decedent and Resident Claimant. No conflict of laws
problems are presented in this local situation. The forum's rule is
applied.
Resident Decedent and Nonresident Claimant. The nonresident
claimant in the domiciliary administration presents a problem in some
states. If the allowance is viewed as an extension of the husband's
duty to support, the nonresident widow and children may claim the
allowance provided in the statutes of the forum-domicile.73 If the
policy behind the allowance is viewed as protecting the state from the
burden of care of indigent persons, the nonresidence of the claimant
precludes the entertaining of a petition for allowance. Unfortunately,
several states have taken this latter view.74 Although some of the cases
71, 72.
71See, e.g., MINN.

STAT. §525.15 (1953); Onio REV. CODE §2117.20 (Page 1954).
72See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §59-403 (Corrick 1949); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§320.211 (Purdon 1950).
7sFarris v. Battle, 80 Ga. 187, 6 S.E. 581 (1887); Shaffer v. Richardson's Adm'r, 27
Ind. 122 (1866); International Harvester Co. v. Dyers Adm'r, 297 Ky. 55, 178
S.V.2d 966 (1944); Barrett v. Heim, 152 Minn. 147, 188 N.W. 207 (1922); In re
Pompal's Estate, 150 Wash. 242, 272 Pac. 980 (1928); cf. Estate of Parkinson, 193
Cal. 354, 224 Pac. 453 (1924); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 192 Iowa 1157, 186 N.W. 58
(1922).
74Lyons v. Egan, 107 Colo. 32, 108 P.2d 873 (1940); In re Metcalf's Estate, 93
Mont. 542, 19 P.2d 905 (1933); In re Babcock's Estate, 64 S.D. 283, 266 N.W. 420
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denying an allowance at the domicile to a nonresident widow may be
explained by analogies to the barring of dower by misconduct,75 such
as desertion and elopement, no such explanation exists as to minor
children.76 A view taken by the state of the domicile of the deceased
that it will deny an allowance unless it may become burdened with
the claimant's care seems inconsistent with any attempt to unify these
aspects of administration around the domicile of the deceased. States
of ancillary administration can scarcely be expected to defer to the
domicile of the deceased in the matter of family allowances if that
state refuses to recognize any responsibility for a nonresident family.
The benefits of the policy of self-protection and self-interest would
seem reasonably to carry with it a duty upon a state to recognize the
estate and family obligations as a unit, so that the fortuitous location
of assets would not prevent a claim by a group whose preferential
claims to assets are generally recognized everywhere.
Nonresident Decedent and Resident Claimant. In this instance
in ancillary administration, the policies exert considerable pressure
upon the forum to grant an allowance to the resident claimant. Both
the policies favoring support of the family and those favoring selfinterest of the state are present. If the domicile of the deceased should
be one of the states adopting the single view of self-interest, the ancillary forum will probably find the force of its local policies irresistible
and grant an allowance from local assets. This illustrates the undesirability, from a conflict of laws view, of decisions based solely upon
the local self-interest policy. The decisions granting allowances from
personal property of a nonresident under the statute of the forum
have been few; they have done so by means of characterizing the support allowance as an expense of administration payable before any
question as to distribution of the estate is reached. On this basis, a
Tennessee court has indicated that support may be granted a resident
infant child of a nonresident decedent from personal property administered in Tennessee even though the state of the decedent's
(1936). The dissent in Metcalf's Estate advocating the opposite result includes a
good discussion of the statutory constructive problem present in many similar
statutes. Accord, Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N.D. 500, 165 N.W. 524 (1917); White
v. Bickford, 146 Tenn. 608, 244 S.W. 49 (1922). But cf. Hyder v. Hyder, 16 Tenn.
App. 64, 66 S.W.2d 235 (1932).
75Odiorne's Appeal, 54 Pa. 175, 93 Am. Dec. 683 (1867); Spier's Appeal, 26 Pa.
233 (1856); cf. In re Grieve's Estate, 165 Pa. 126, 30 Atl. 727 (1895).
76See, e.g., Lyons v. Egan, supra note 74; In re Metcalf's Estate, supra note 74.
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domicile makes no provision for support.77
Nonresident Decedent and Nonresident Claimant. The situation
in which neither the decedent nor the beneficiary is domiciled in the
state of ancillary administration of movables has given rise to considerable litigation. Many cases have restated the general rule that
an allowance to a nonresident decedent's family is governed by the
domicile of the deceased. Some of these rely upon the self-interest
theory of protecting only resident families; 78 others consider it a part
of the distribution problem. 79 There is some suggestion that if an
allowance in the ancillary administration is made at all it must be
made according to the law of the decedent's domicile.8 0 More often
than not, however, the view is that only the courts of the domicile
should entertain such petitions.8'
The harshness of blindly adopting the view that the law of the
domicile not only governs the amount but also that its courts alone
may grant an allowance is illustrated by Jaeglin v. Moakley. 82 The
decedent died domiciled in California. His wife predeceased him,
but three minor children survived. The only asset in the estate was
realty in Missouri. At the time of the petition for an allowance out
of the Missouri realty two children were still residing in California, but
the third was residing with a relative in Missouri. The Missouri court
denied an allowance for the support of the infants after intervention
and objection by a nonresident creditor. The court concluded that
the children must look to the domicile of the decedent for allowances,
stating: "That court's exclusive authority to grant the allowance is
not altered by the unfortunate circumstance that it has no assets within
its jurisdiction out of which the allowances can be paid." 8' 3 The court
apparently preferred the policy of protecting creditors over those
favoring the support of the family and the state's self-interest, since one
77Hyder v. Hyder, 16 Tenn. App. 64, 66 S.W.2d 235 (1932); accord, Jones v.
Layne, 144 N.C. 600, 57 S.E. 372 (1907), in which the analogy to priority of claims
is expressly made. But cf. White v. Bickford, 146 Tenn. 608, 244 S.W. 49 (1922).
781n re Estate of Beauchamp, 23 Del. Ch. 377, 2 A.2d 900 (Orphan's Ct. 1988).
70Shannon v. White, 109 Mass. 146 (1872); Richardson v. Lewis, 21 Mo. App.

531 (1886).
soMitchell v. Word, 64 Ga. 208 (1879); Simpson v. Cureton, 97 N.C. 113, 2 S.E.

668 (1887).
sSmith v. Howard, 86 Me. 203, 29 At. 1008 (1894); Jaeglin v. Moakley, 286 Mo.
App. 254, 11 S.W.2d 524 (1941).
82236 Mb. App. 254, 151 S.W.2d 524 (1941).
8s-d. at 260, 151 S.W.2d at 527.
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infant had become a Missouri resident. The creditor that prevailed
probably could not have recovered in California had the land been
there, or in Missouri if the deceased had been domiciled in that state.
By the court's refusal the nonresident creditor recovered, whereas he
could not have done so in a local situation in either state. That this is
a desirable solution of the conflicting policies seems questionable. Certainly conflict of laws policies are opposed to a windfall resulting from
fortuitous contacts and the cumulative effect of blind application of
conflicts doctrines.
The states of California and Washington have been exceptionally
liberal in granting allowances in ancillary administration. Decisions
there have indicated that nonresident claimants can obtain allowances
4
under the statutes of the forum, at least as long as the estate is solvent.
85
For example, the California court in Estate of Foreman, in approving
a "reasonable" allowance to the widow of $1,250 per month over
the contention by a creditor that the law of the decedent's domicile
governed, indicated that neither the residence of the deceased nor of
the surviving spouse was controlling. The court did, however, call
attention to the fact that the widow had since become domiciled in
California. The basis of the California deci6ion seems to be the
characterization of the allowance as a preferred claim against the
estate rather than a distributive share.8 6
Ohio has one of the few statutes expressly providing for allowances
to nonresidents in ancillary administration.7 This statute provides
for such an allowance only when not provided for by the domicile.
The statute may well have been designed to cover the situation in
which the state of a decedent's domicile adopts a self-interest attitude
and denies an allowance to dependents resident in Ohio. If this was
the purpose, the statute is not so limited by its terms. Probably the
policy of the state goes beyond retaliatory self-interest and favors
support allowances generally for dependents claiming assets in Ohio
administration. The former view of allowances as tax-saving devices
may have been partially responsible also. At any rate the statute suggests a preference for nonresident dependents over resident creditors.
841n re Pugh's Estate, 22 Wash.2d 83, 154 P.2d 308 (1944); In re Johnson's Estate,
114 Wash. 61, 194 Pac. 834 (1921).
8516 Cal. App.2d 96, 60 P.2d 310 (1936).
Sld. at 100, 60 P.2d at 312 (quoting with approval from 2 BANCROFT, PROBATE
PRAcTcE 1322).
s70mo REv. CODE §2117.23 (Page 1954); see also MINN. STAT. §525.15 (4) (1953).
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The interesting case of In re McComb's Estates " construed the
Ohio statute in a situation in which both the decedent and the claimant were nonresidents. The court concluded that a domiciliary statute
making the granting of an allowance to the widow dependent upon the
insufficiency of the widow's separate estate did not satisfy the Ohio
conditions, so an allowance of a year's support of $7,500 was properly
made in the Ohio ancillary administration. The construction of the
Ohio statute is for the Ohio courts, but whether a statute of the
domicile is unreasonable because it makes the allowance depend upon
need of the claimants is a matter upon which reasonable men can
differ. In the matter of interstate administration it would seem that
considerable deference should be made to the domicile if any provision would be made there for the claimant.
The family allowance problem may assume very serious proportions, especially in smaller estates. The states generally recognize, at
least in local cases, that the members of the decedent's family who were
dependent upon him for support are to be given a limited prior claim.
The need for this support allowance is not, of course, alleviated by
the fact that all assets or parties are not within the same state; actually,
multi-state cases may often have factors increasing the need of the
dependents for the allowance. It seems, therefore, that the primary
policy is to provide interim maintenance for those dependents. The
device must not be used to abuse the policies favoring protection of
creditors or the distribution of assets to those properly entitled. It is
submitted that the rank of these policies in conflict of laws is, in
broad outline, the same as that indicated in the local statuies of
nearly every state providing for priority of disbursements of estate
funds. This priority is generally as follows: (1) family and widow's
allowances, (2) creditors' claims, (3) distribution. In an interstate
estate the allocation to each of these must reasonably reconcile the
policies of all states involved. Each state should be aware that its
own detailed provisions are not the only reasonable ones that might
be adopted and that accommodation must be made to the policies of
other states.
The case of Simpson v. Curetons 9 suggests in part at least a reasonable solution. The decedent died domiciled in South Carolina, leaving
personal assets in North Carolina. Although the North Carolina court
denied the nonresident widow's application for allowance under the
8880 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio Prob. 1948).
8997 N.C. 113, 2 S.E. 668 (1887).
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statutes of North Carolina, it indicated that allowance should be made
according to the law of the decedent's domicile and that, if the assets
in South Carolina were insufficient to satisfy the allowance, North
Carolina assets would be used to satisfy the allowance, subject to
claims of North Carolina creditors. This is one of the few cases purporting to view the problem as one involving a single estate.
In viewing family allowance problems as a whole, it is clear that
an allowance should be made somewhere to protect the family; still,
this should not unduly impair the reasonable expectations of creditors
and distributees. Above all, it should not invite retaliation by another
state. Domicile is the unifying center about which estates are administered. Creditors normally file their claims at the domicile and,
for their protection, investigate exemptions there. This is not, however,
the case in some situations in which the domicile is not readily known.
In order to meet this possibility it seems reasonable in ancillary administration to grant at least the lesser allowance permitted under
either the law of the forum or of the domicile, deducting any amounts
already received elsewhere. 90 This would give a reasonable allowance
and yet not create a windfall to creditors simply because of the multistate nature of the case. It would also preclude the use of the family
allowance statutes to effect a different final distribution of the assets
from that provided by governing law. Such a solution could at least
cover the emergency period of administration without threat of retaliation or creditors' suits until distribution could be made. This
would be consistent with the statutes permitting a discretionary allowance and also could fit within the lump sum provisions by reason
of crediting payments already made elsewhere. Lump sum provisions
would never be exceeded, though less might be granted.
b. Enforcement of Foreign Allowance Orders
An important question arises when the assets at the domicile are
insufficient to satisfy an allowance order and the domiciliary order is
sought to be enforced in ancillary administration. The foreign allowance order is usually denied enforcement in ancillary administration. This conclusion has been uniform in the few cases decided.91 The
9OSee, e.g., MINN. STAT. §525.15 (4) (1953), which expressly provides for deduction of amounts received at the domicile from that reserved in Minnesota.
9'Smith v. Smith, 174 Ill. 52, 50 N.E. 1083 (1898); Gaskins v. Gaskins, 311 Ky.
59, 225 S.W.2d 374 (1949); Short v. Galway, 85 Ky. 501, 4 Am. St. Rep. 168 (1886);
In re Estate of Schram, 132 Neb. 268, 271 N.W. 694 (1987); see R=STATEMENT OF
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recent Kentucky case of Gaskin v. Gaskin92 illustrates the position
usually taken. The Kentucky court refused to honor an allowance
order from the domiciliary probate court in Georgia as a claim
against realty in Kentucky. The court based its decision on the ground
that to enforce the decree would permit foreign law to determine the
devolution of Kentucky land. The court reached its conclusion in
spite of the constitutional argument that the Georgia decree was entitled to full faith and credit. The Supreme Court of the United States
has not yet passed on this issue.
Normally great weight would be given to the argument that the
domicile is the state most interested in matrimonial matters and that
when the husband's duty to support is reduced to a court decree it
should be enforceable everywhere. A post mortem extension of this
duty seems to stand on no different ground. This conclusion is not
so easily reached, however, when the nature of the modem family or
the widow's allowance is considered. Is a widow's allowance for support or is it also a partial distribution of the estate? As has been
mentioned before, the overlap of the statutory provisions for family
allowance, forced share, and homestead is such that it is doubtful that
a substitution for the husband's duty to support is the only factor leading to their adoption. This is particularly true when a surviving husband can claim a support allowance, or when the allowance overlaps
the small estate distribution scheme.
The policies present in distributive share interests are also present
in the allowance statutes of many states. To the extent that a foreign
allowance order constitutes partial distribution, its application to local
realty is inconsistent with traditional conflict of laws rules governing
distribution of realty; and, since administration is viewed as an in
rem proceeding, the foreign court is without jurisdiction.93 Accordingly, as long as family allowance statutes are so diverse and the danger
to creditors' interests so great, the conclusion that the domicile's
order need not be enforced against foreign real estate is perhaps
justified.

94

CoN'ucrs §302, comment a (1934).

92311 Ky. 59, 223 S.W.2d 374 (1949).
931t is believed that inter vivos support obligations and statutes are sufficiently
uniform not to be subject to the objection present in allowances from decedent
estates and thus are distinguishable in regard to foreign enforcement under the
full faith and credit clause. Cf. Scoles, Enforcement of Foreign "Non-final" Alimony
and Support Orders, 53 COL. L. REv. 817 (1953).
94See Hansel v.'Chapman, 2 App. D.C. 361, 372 (1894): "...
it would breed

endless confusion in the administration of justice if real estate in this District were
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Although the same arguments can be made as to enforcement of
domiciliary allowance orders against movables in ancillary administration, there is no real reason why such orders should not be enforced
when the estate is solvent. This result is based on the different law
governing distribution. The argument that the domiciliary allowance
order is in effect distribution has no weight against enforcement, since
domiciliary law governs distribution of movables.
To recognize that foreign allowance orders do not come within the
ambit of the full faith and credit clause is not to say that, when need
is shown, the state of the situs of land should refuse an allowance to
the widow and family simply because of the estate owner's nonresidence. Considering the relative weight of the policies protecting the
tamily and those protecting creditors, at least as much protection
should be allowed a nonresident family as a resident one. The creditors
can be amply protected by the court's taking into consideration sums
actually received under foreign orders and directing that only the
balance be paid; this will bring the total amount received to at least
the lesser amount allowed by either the domicile or the situs.
Homestead
Immovables. The interests arising from probate homestead exemptions relating to land are such as to be peculiarly within the
control of the state in which the immovable is located. This is for
several reasons: (1) the interest is within the usual situs reference rule;
(2) the situs is by far the most probable forum of litigation of such
interests; and (3) situs and domicile coincide to give the situs state
the most dominant interests. Requirements for the acquisition of a
homestead are based upon (1) residence or domicile upon a particular
piece of land or (2) the setting aside of a homestead in the state of
domicile of the deceased. 95 This means that the determination of
homestead interests is a matter nearly always local to the state of the
situs. Even in situations involving conflicting conclusions as to domicile, it is a local matter for the state of the situs to decide whether it
is to be bound by a foreign domicile finding. The very purpose of
liable to be subjected to the arbitrary, and probably discordant charges that might
be sought to be made against it by other States, and even by foreign nations, under
the guise or pretense of widow's allowance, homestead exemptions, or other similar
provisions, peculiarly matters of local public policy."
95See statutes cited supra note 15; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §5.114; Haskins,
Homestead Exemptions, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1289 (1950).
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homestead - to protect the continuing home of the family- prevents
many substantial conflict of laws problems from arising. Even the
problem as to whether the claimant as well as the decedent must be a
resident of the situs state is essentially a local problem of statutory
construction.0 6
The problem of priorities and interests in the proceeds from sale
of foreign homestead realty ordinarily will not arise, because the
homestead is located at the domicile, the place to which the proceeds
of such a sale normally would be transmitted for distribution if not
distributed locally. One way for the proceeds of a sale of homestead
realty to be subject to administration in a state other than the domicile
is by operation of the doctrine of equitable conversion. If the owner
of homestead land makes a contract to sell it, the vendor's right
against the purchaser for the purchase price may be administered
where the purchaser is subject to suit. Another example of the unusual
situation in which a fund representing the homestead may be found
in another state arises when insurance proceeds covering damage to
the homestead are garnished in another state. In Sanders v. Armour
Fertilizer Works 97 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Illinois court's characterization of the inter vivos debtor's homestead
exemption as the creature of local law and without force outside the
state.
Whether the same result would be reached in a probate homestead
case is uncertain. There is adequate reason in the policies behind
the probate homestead laws to view them in a different light from
the inter vivos debtor's homestead provisions. In the inter vivos cases
the defendant seeks to protect himself from his own undertakings. The
interests of the family survivors in the probate homestead, however,
06Matthews v. Matthews, 249 Ala. 611, 32 So.2d 514 (1947), illustrates the
usual view. The court stated at 612, 32 So.2d at 514: "The prerequisite to a widow's
right to homestead exemptions is the residence in this state of her husband at the
time of his death and residence as here considered means domicile, the place where
his habitation was fixed without any present intention of changing it." Accord,
Croker v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1931); In re Graham's Estate, 73 Ariz. 179, 239
P.2d 365 (1951); Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Miller v. West
Palm Beach Atl. Natl Bank, 142 Fla. 22, 194 So. 230 (1940); Leonetti v. Tolton,
264 Mich. 618, 250 N.W. 512 (1933); S. D. Scott & Co. v. Jones, 230 N.C. 74, 52 S.E.2d
219 (1949); Ex parte Morrow, 183 S.C. 170, 190 S.E. 506 (1937); Dorm v. Stidham,
139 S.C. 66, 137 S.E. 331 (1927); Carson v. McFarland, 206 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947); United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Midvale Home Finance Corp., 86
Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090 (1935).
07292 U.S. 190 (1934).
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are often opposed to the testamentary disposition of the deceased as
well as to the interests of his creditors. In other words, the interest of
the survivors is more analogous to dower than to the debtor's inter
vivos exemptions. The surviving family has an interest in its own right;
this should be recognized even if raised in litigation in another state.""
Although the priorities of creditors under inter vivos debtor's exemption statutes are usually considered to be procedural matters governed
by the forum, it is preferable in decedents' homestead matters to enforce the situs priorities and avoid the windfall for creditors based on
"fortuitous" or other destruction of homestead premises. 9
Movables. Very few conflict of laws questions arise as to homestead rights in movable property. This is because the statutes providing for homestead exemptions of personal property usually relate
to personalty located on the real estate homestead.100 Since homestead rights as to both personalty and realty depend upon domicile,
there are few instances in which problems arise in ancillary administration. This means that there normally are no rights before the forum
other than those granted by local law. The possibility of casual insurance proceeds being garnished in a state other than the domicile is present here as in realty homestead. Should this occur, the results would
probably parallel those discussed above.
An interesting case raising some potential problems is O'Donnell
v. Wendell, 101 in which the decedent died domiciled in Michigan and
was survived there by his widow. The decedent and his widow owned
jointly three pieces of residential real property, each fully furnished.
One was their home in Michigan, another a summer place in Canada,
and the third a winter place in Florida. The widow, having succeeded
to the title of the realty by reason of her survivorship, refused to account to the estate for the household furnishings at any of the three
residences. The Michigan court sustained her action on the ground
that under the Michigan statute she was entitled to the household
furniture wherever located. The reasoning was that creditors could
9S8Griggs' Estate, 54 Pa. D. & C. 25 (1945); cf. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v.
McRae, 75 Fla. 257, 78 So. 22 (1918); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 8 N.J. 157, 84 A.2d 441
(1951); United States Mtge. & Trust Co. v. Ruggles, 258 N.Y. 32, 179 N.E. 250

(1932).
OgCompare the insurable interest requirements of insurance law with the
"fortuitous" nature of the windfall possible to creditors in this situation.
looSee note 14 supra.
101331 Mich. 592, 50 N.W.2d 166 (1951).
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not object because this exemption was prior to creditors' claims. Although the provision involved was part of the widow's allowance
statute rather than a homestead exemption, it is one that often is included in homestead statutes. Some doubt may be raised as to the
effectiveness in ancillary administration of such a statute of the domicile if a reasonable balance is to be struck between the policies favoring
creditors and widows. Normally such provisions are construed to apply
10 2
to local assets only.
CONCLUSION

The choice of law patterns suggested in this discussion of nonbarrable interests in decedents' estates are centered around the state of
the domicile. The problems have as their orbit the family and the
family home. This means that the state most concerned is the state
with which the family and the decedent have had some kind of enduring relationship. Domicile is a continuing relationship between
persons and a state. Thus, while it is an unsatisfactory concept in
many instances, domicile is the best contact at hand and - what is
more important - it corresponds to the factual situations in most
cases. It is submitted that the policies involved in these matters of
nonbarrable interests in multi-state administrations clearly indicate
the need for recognition of the single measure that the state of the
domicile can give. Even so, it is not suggested that every case should
be governed by the law of the domicile. Rather, it is believed that the
pertinent policies should be considered as they appear in each case and
that the conflict of laws problems should be resolved by reference to
the law of the state indicated by these policies. In matters concerning
interests created by reason of the family relation, it is expected that
these should be of most interest to the state in which the family has
its home.

02

1 1n re McCombs' Estate, 80 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio Prob. 1948).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol8/iss2/1
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